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Abstract—This paper analyzes the security of a new multistage
encryption system (MES) recently proposed in ISCAS’2004. It
is found that MES is insecure against a differential chosen-
plaintext/ciphertext attack. Experiments are given to support the
proposed attack. It is also pointed out that the security of MES
against brute-force attacks is not sufficiently high.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, the use of chaotic systems in cryptography
attracts more and more attention as a new source for designing
secure communication systems and encryption schemes [1].
In recent years, Yen et al. proposed a series of encryption
schemes based on the 1-D chaotic Logistic map, but some of
them have been successfully broken [2, Sec. 4.4.3].
In [3], a multistage encryption system (MES) was proposed
by Yen et al. as a new solution to provide a higher security
level than their previous schemes. The present paper focuses
on cryptanalysis of this new encryption scheme. MES is
designed by combining the basic encryption techniques used in
previous schemes, such as BRIE [4], RSES/RCES [5], [6] and
TDCEA [7], [8], which have been cryptanalyzed in [9]–[11],
respectively. Although the combination makes MES securer
against the known-plaintext attacks, which can break previous
schemes, this paper points out that MES is still insecure
against a differential chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attack. Only
three chosen plaintexts/ciphertexts are enough to construct
some specific differentials to totally break MES. It is also
noticed that the security of MES against brute-force attacks is
not sufficiently strong.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives a brief introduction to MES. The proposed differential
attack is discussed in detail in Sec. III, where some exper-
imental results are given to support the theoretical analysis.
A brief analysis on the security against brute-force attacks is
then given in Sec. IV. The last section concludes the paper.
II. THE MULTISTAGE ENCRYPTION SYSTEM (MES)
MES encrypts the plaintext block by block, where each
block contains 7 plain-bytes. Each 7-byte plain-block is firstly
expanded to an 8-byte block by adding a secret pseudo-random
byte, and then is encrypted by three different operations: byte
permutation, value masking, and bit recirculation, which are
all controlled by a secret pseudo-random bit sequence (PRBS)
¶This paper has been published in Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Interna-
tional Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS 2005, May, 2005, Kobe,
Japan), pp. 880-883, 2005.
generated from the chaotic Logistic map [12]: x(k + 1) =
µ · x(k) · (1− x(k)).
To facilitate the description of MES, without loss of
generality, assume that the plaintext is f = {f(i)}N−1i=0 ,
where f(i) denotes the i-th plain-byte and N can be exactly
divided by 7. In this case, the plaintext has N/7 blocks:
f = {f (7)(k)}N/7−1k=0 , where f (7)(k) = {f (7)(k, j)}6j=0 =
{f(7k + j)}6j=0. Similarly, assume that the ciphertext is
f ′ = {f ′(i)}N−1i=0 = {f ′(8)(k)}N/7−1k=0 , where f ′(8)(k) =
{f ′(8)(k, j)}7j=0 = {f ′(8k + j)}7j=0 denotes the expanded
cipher-block with 8 bytes. With the above notations, MES can
be described as follows.
1) The secret key: three integers α, β, Open, the control
parameter µ and the initial condition x(0) of the chaotic
Logistic map, where α > 0, β > 0, α + β < 8 and
Open ∈ {0, · · · , 255}.
2) The initialization procedure: a) in 33-bit fixed-point
finite precision, run the Logistic map from x(0) to generate
a chaotic sequence, {x(k)}N/7−1k=0 , and then extract the 33
bits of x(k) = 0.b33k+0 · · · b33k+32 to yield a chaotic PRBS,
{b(i)}33N/7−1i=0 ; b) set temp = Open.
3) The encryption procedure of each plain-block f (7)(k) is
composed of the following four steps:
a) Data expansion: get an 8-byte block, f (8)(k) =
{f (8)(k, j)}7j=0 = {temp, f (7)(k, 0), · · · , f (7)(k, 6)}, and
then set temp = f (8)(k, l(k)), where l(k) =
2∑
i=0
b(33k+i)·2i.
b) Byte permutation: do the random swapping operation,
Swapb(33k+l)
(
f (8)(k, i), f (8)(k, j)
)
, for 12 times with the
following parameters in order: (i, j, l) = (0, 4, 3), (1, 5, 4),
(2, 6, 5), (3, 7, 6), (0, 2, 7), (1, 3, 8), (4, 6, 9), (5, 7, 10),
(0, 1, 11), (2, 3, 12), (4, 5, 13), (6, 7, 14), where Swapw(a, b)
outputs (b, a) when w = 1 and (a, b) when w = 0. Denote
the permuted 8-byte block by f∗(8)(k).
c) Random masking: determine two pseudo-random
bytes, Seed1(k) =
∑7
i=0 b(33k + i) · 27−i and Seed2(k) =∑7
i=0 b(33k+8+ i) ·27−i, and then do the following masking
operations for j = 0 ∼ 7:
f∗∗(8)(k, j) = f∗(8)(k, j)⊕ Seed(k, j), (1)
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation,
Seed(k, j) =

Seed1(k), B(k, j) = 3,
Seed1(k), B(k, j) = 2,
Seed2(k), B(k, j) = 1,
Seed2(k), B(k, j) = 0,
(2)
and B(k, j) = 2 · b(33k + 16 + j) + b(33k + 17 + j).
d) Bit recirculation: for j = 0 ∼ 7, do
f ′(8k + j) = f ′(8)(k, j) = ROLRq(k,j)p(k,j)
(
f∗∗(8)(k, j)
)
, (3)
where p(k, j) = b(33k + 24 + j), q(k, j) = α + β · b(33k +
25+j), and ROLRqp denotes the q-bit cyclical shift operation
whose direction is controlled by p as follows:
ROLRqp(a) =
{
a≫ q, p = 0,
a≪ q, p = 1,
(4)
where “≪” denotes the cyclical left-shift operation and “≫”
denotes the cyclical right-shift operation.
4) The decryption procedure is the simple inverse of the
above encryption procedure: for the k-th 8-byte cipher-block
f ′(8)(k), Step d) is first performed by replacing p(k, j) with its
complement p(k, j) = 1− p(k, j), then Step c) is performed,
and then Step b) is performed in the reversed order, finally the
first byte is discarded to recover the plain-block f (7)(k).
III. THE PROPOSED DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK
A. Three properties of MES
Define the XOR-differential (“differential” in short) of two
signals f0 and f1 as f0⊕1 = f0⊕ f1. Then, it is easy to prove
the following three properties of MES, which will be the basis
of the proposed attack.
Property 1: The random masking in Step c) cannot change
the differential value, i.e., ∀ k, j, f∗∗(8)0⊕1 (k, j) ≡ f∗(8)0⊕1 (k, j).
Proof: From Eq. (1), f∗∗(8)0⊕1 (k, j) = f
∗∗(8)
0 (k, j) ⊕
f
∗∗(8)
1 (k, j) = (f
∗(8)
0 (k, j) ⊕ Seed(k, j)) ⊕ (f∗(8)1 (k, j) ⊕
Seed(k, j)) = f∗(8)0 (k, j)⊕ f∗(8)1 (k, j) = f∗(8)0⊕1 (k, j).
Property 2: If the plaintext and the chaotic bit sequence are
fixed, all differential bytes in f (8)0⊕1(k) are fixed, i.e., f
(8)
0⊕1(k)
are independent of the value of Open.
Proof: For the first byte of each 8-byte block, if temp =
Open, f (8)0⊕1(k, 0) = 0; otherwise, temp is one plain-byte
occurring before f (7)(k), which means f (8)0⊕1(k, 0) is one of
the differential bytes occurring before f (7)0⊕1(k). Apparently,
the differential value f (8)0⊕1(k, 0) is independent of the value
of Open, but uniquely determined by the plaintext and the
secret chaotic sequence. Since the other 7 bytes in f (8)0⊕1(k)
are also independent of Open, this property is thus proved.
Properties 1 and 2 mean that MES is reduced to be a three-
stage cipher with Open = 0 (thus becomes a modification of
TDCEA [7], [8]), from the differential point of view.
Property 3: The byte permutation in Step b) cannot change
each differential value, but its position in the 8-byte block.
Proof: This property is obviously true since the byte
permutation only change the position of each byte.
A natural result of the above property is: if f (8)0⊕1(k, 0) =
· · · = f (8)0⊕1(k, 7), then it is true that f (8)0⊕1(k) = f∗∗(8)0⊕1 (k).
This means that MES is further reduced to be a two-stage
cipher (and be a data-expansion modification of BRIE [4]),
for differential blocks with 8 identical bytes.
B. The differential attack
Utilizing Property 3 and the cryptanalysis on BRIE given
in [9], one can easily break the secret bit recirculations in
Step d). Then, the secret byte permutations in Step b) and
the secret data expansion in Step a) can be further broken by
using Properties 1 and 2. Finally, the secret masking operations
in Step c) will be recovered immediately. After all secret
operations in the four steps are revealed, most secret chaotic
bits can be broken to derive the secret key with a sufficiently
small complexity, which leads to the complete breaking of
MES. Note that the proposed differential attack can be carried
out by choosing either plaintexts or ciphertexts.
1) Breaking the secret ROLR operation in Step d): Choose
two plaintexts to obtain the following differential signal f0⊕1:
∀ i = 0 ∼ N − 1, f0⊕1(i) ≡ a. From the generation rule
of f (8)(k, 0), there exists a threshold integer, k0 ≥ 1, such
that f (8)0⊕1(k, 0) ≡ 0 when k ≤ k0 and f (8)0⊕1(k, 0) ≡ a when
k > k0. Assuming that a 6= 0 and each chaotic bit distribute
uniformly over {0, 1}, one can deduce that Prob[k0 = n] =
Prob[l(0) = · · · = l(n − 1) = 0 and l(n) 6= 0] = 7/8n+1.
This means that f (8)0⊕1(k, 0) ≡ a is almost true when k is
sufficiently large. In this case, f (8)0⊕1(k, 0) = · · · = f (8)0⊕1(k, 7)
is true, so from Property 3 one can see that only Step
d) is left for MES, i.e., ∀ j = 0 ∼ 7, f ′(8)0⊕1(k, j) =
ROLR
q(k,j)
p(k,j)
(
f
(8)
0⊕1(k, j)
)
= ROLRq(k,j)p(k,j)(a). Now, MES is
reduced to be BRIE, and the secret ROLR operations can be
broken by setting a = 1 as discussed in [9]:
ROLR
q(k,j)
p(k,j) = ROLR
8−qˆ(k,j)
0 = ROLR
qˆ(k,j)
1 , (5)
where qˆ(k, j) = log2
(
f
′(8)
0⊕1(k, j)
)
, which is the new position
of the only 1-bit of a = 1 after the ROLR operation.
2) Breaking the secret byte permutation in Step b): Since
the secret ROLR operations in Step d) has been recov-
ered, from the differential point of view, MES becomes a
permutation-only cipher with data expansion. As we analyzed
in [13], all permutation-only ciphers are not secure enough
against chosen-plaintext attacks. If two plaintexts are chosen to
ensure that any two elements in each 8-byte differential block
are different, one can uniquely determine the secret permuta-
tions by comparing f (8)0⊕1(k, 1) ∼ f (8)0⊕1(k, 7) and f∗(8)0⊕1 (k, 0) ∼
f
∗(8)
0⊕1 (k, 7). It is easy to do so in chosen-ciphertext attacks, by
choosing 8 different cipher-bytes for each f∗(8)0⊕1 (k). In chosen-
plaintext attacks, since f∗(8)0⊕1 (k, 0) cannot be freely chosen,
the condition is a little more complicated. Let us choose
two plaintexts to get the following differential signal f0⊕1:
∀ i = 0 ∼ N , f0⊕1(i) = (i + 1) mod 256. In this case,
assuming that each chaotic bit distributes uniformly, one can
calculate Pc = Prob[f0⊕1(k, 0) ∈ {f0⊕1(k, j)}7j=1], as:
• Pc = 0 when 0 ≤ k ≤ b255/7c − 1 = 35;
• Pc ≤ 1/835 = 1/2105 when k ≥ 36.
It is obvious that Pc is negligible in all cases, and it is
almost true that ∀ i, j ∈ {0, · · · , 7} and i 6= j, f∗(8)0⊕1 (k, i) 6=
f
∗(8)
0⊕1 (k, j). As a result, the secret permutation of the k-th
block can be uniquely determined as a bijective index-mapping
F (k, i) = i′, where i, i′ ∈ {0, · · · , 7}. If some bytes in
f0⊕1(k) happen to be identical, one can choose one more pair
of plaintexts to try to recover the secret permutations.
3) Breaking the secret data expansion in Step a): Once the
secret permutations of two consecutive blocks, f (8)0⊕1(k) and
f
(8)
0⊕1(k+1), are broken, one can immediately get the value of
l(k) by finding the position of f (8)0⊕1(k + 1, 0) in the 8 bytes
of f (8)0⊕1(k).
4) Breaking the secret masking parameters in Step c):
After Steps a), b) and d) are broken, the two intermediate
blocks, f∗(8)0 (k) and f
∗∗(8)
0 (k) can be derived from f0 and f
′
0,
respectively. Then, the masking parameters can be calculated
as follows: ∀ k, j, Seed(k, j) = f∗(8)0 (k, j)⊕ f∗∗(8)0 (k, j).
5) Breaking the secret chaotic bits and the secret key:
Though the recovered secret operations in the above procedure
can be used as the equivalent of the secret key to decrypt the
ciphertexts, one can still further derive the secret chaotic bits,
and then try to derive the values of α, β, µ and x(0). Since
the knowledge of Open does not influence the decryption, it
is excluded from the secret key.
In Step a), the three involved chaotic bits, b(33k + 0) ∼
b(33k + 2) can be directly derived from the value of l(k).
In Step c), 25 chaotic bits are involved: b(33k + 0) ∼
b(33k + 7) and b(33k + 8) ∼ b(33k + 15) determine
Seed1(k) and Seed2(k), respectively, and b(33k + 16) ∼
b(33k + 24) determine B(k, 0) ∼ B(k, 7). To derive the
unknown bits, one has to search for the values of Seed1(k)
and Seed2(k) in the set {Seed(k, 0), · · · , Seed(k, 7)} ⊆
{Seed1(k), Seed1(k), Seed2(k), Seed2(k)}. Apparently, the
maximal number of possible combinations of Seed1(k) and
Seed2(k) is 8. The three known bits b(33k+0) ∼ b(33k+2)
can be used to eliminate some invalid combinations. Also, note
that B(k, j) and B(k, j +1) (j = 0 ∼ 6) have a common bit,
b(33k + 17 + j), which can be used as a second constraint
to eliminate invalid combinations of Seed1(k) and Seed2(k).
In most cases, the values of Seed1(k) and Seed2(k) can be
uniquely determined, and then all the 25 chaotic bits can be
derived (see the experimental result in the next subsection).
In Step d), 9 chaotic bits, b(33k + 24) ∼ b(33k + 32), are
used to determine the values of p(k, j) and q(k, j), together
with α and β. Observing the bit-recirculation procedure and
Eq. (5), one can see that qˆ(k, j) ∈ Q = {α, α+ β, 8−α, 8−
(α+β)} holds. So, by exhaustively searching for all 1+ · · ·+
6 = 21 possible combinations of α and β, one can determine
the 9 chaotic bits with the following equations: ∀ j = 0 ∼ 7,
b(33k+25+j) =
{
0, qˆ(k, j) ∈ {α, 8− α},
1, qˆ(k, j) ∈ {α+ β, 8− (α+ β)}, (6)
b(33k+24+j) =
{
0, qˆ(k, j) ∈ {α, α+ β},
1, qˆ(k, j) ∈ {8− α, 8− (α+ β)}. (7)
Note Eq. (6) is invalid when α = 8−(α+β), i.e., 2α+β = 8,
and Eq. (7) is invalid when α = 4, α+ β = 4 or 2α+ β = 8.
According to how the two equations can be used to determine
the 9 chaotic bits from {qˆ(k, j)}7j=0, all possible values of
(α, β) can be divided into the following three classes.
• C1) α 6= 4, α + β 6= 4 and 2α + β 6= 8: both Eqs. (6)
and (7) are valid, so all the 9 chaotic bits, b(33k+24) ∼
b(33k + 32), can be uniquely determined. There are 12
C1-values, all of which satisfy #(Q) = 4.
• C2) 4 ∈ {α, α+β} (which ensures 2α+β 6= 8): Eq. (6)
is valid and the 8 chaotic bits, b(33k+25) ∼ b(33k+32),
can be uniquely determined. When α = 4 and b(33k +
25) = 1, or α 6= 4 and b˜(33k + 25) = 0, one can also
determine b(33k+24) by Eq. (7). There are 6 C2-values,
all of which satisfy #(Q) = 3.
• C3) 2α+β = 8: Eqs. (6) and (7) are not valid, so all the
9 chaotic bits have to be exhaustively guessed. There are
3 C3-values, which satisfy #(Q) = 2.
* For C2/C3-classes, note that b(33k+24) can be recovered
in Step c) in a high probability.
Since the above three classes correspond to different values
of #(Q), one need not search for all 21 values of (α, β),
but those corresponding to #(Q), which can reduce the
search complexity to some extent. The value of #(Q) can
be estimated from the cardinality of Q′ = {qˆ(k, j)}N/7−1,7k=0,j=0 ,
or one of its subset. It is obvious that #(Q′) = #(Q) almost
true when N is sufficiently large.
To verify which guessed value of (α, β) is the real one,
the following procedure is useful by estimating the values of
two consecutive chaotic states, x(k) and x(k + 1), and the
value of µ. Assuming all the 33 chaotic bits, b(33k + 0) ∼
b(33k + 32) have been successfully recovered (or guessed)
with the above procedure, one can immediately get the value
of x(k) = 0.b(33k+0) ∼ b(33k+32). After getting x(k+1) in
a similar way, one can calculate an estimation of µ as follows:
µ˜ = x(k+1)x(k)·(1−x(k)) . Due to the quantization errors introduced in
the finite-precision arithmetic, generally µ˜ 6= µ. Following the
error analysis given in [14, Sec. 4.2], when x(k + 1) ≥ 2−n,
|µ˜−µ| < 2n+3 ·2−33. Specially, when x(k+1) ≥ 2−1 = 0.5,
one can exhaustively search for the 24 = 16 values in the
neighborhood of µ˜ to find the right value of µ.
By iterating the Logistic map from x(k+1) until x(N/7−1)
and then checking the coincidence between these chaotic states
and the corresponding bits that can be uniquely derived, one
can detect wrong values of (α, β) and µ and distinguish the
real ones. To minimize the complexity, one can check only
a number of chaotic states, sufficiently far from x(k + 1), to
eliminate most wrong values, and verify the few left ones by
checking all chaotic states from x(k + 2) to x(N/7− 1).
C. Experiments and the attack complexity
As discussed above, to carry out the differential chosen-
plaintext attack, only three plaintexts are enough to construct
two plaintext differentials as follows: 1) ∀ i = 0 ∼ N − 1,
f0⊕1(i) ≡ 1; 2) ∀ i = 0 ∼ N − 1, f0⊕1(i) = (i + 1) mod
256. When one plaintext is chosen as an image “Lenna”, the
performance of the proposed attack has been tested, and the
results are shown in Fig. 1. The two differentials are used to
break the secret operations and then try to break some chaotic
bits. It is found that for 8084 blocks in total 9363 ones, all
the 33 involved chaotic bits can be uniquely determined. Two
chaotic states, x(1) and x(2), are used to estimate µ, and then
to find the secret key for recovering the ciphertext of another
image “Peppers” (see Figs. 1c and d).
a) Original “Lenna” b) Encrypted “Lenna”
c) Encrypted “Peppers” d) Recovered “Peppers”
Fig. 1. The differential chosen-plaintext attack to MES
Finally, we briefly discuss the attack complexity. It can
be easily verified that the complexity of breaking all secret
operations is proportional to N . The complexity of breaking
the secret key depends on the value of (α, β). When (α, β)
belongs to C1 and C2 classes, the attack complexity is also
proportional to N ; when (α, β) belongs to C3 class, the attack
complexity is 28 · 28 = 216 times of the complexity of that in
C1/C2 cases, which is still practically small.
IV. SECURITY AGAINST BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKS
Another obvious problem of MES is that the key space is not
cryptographically large. The secret key for decrypting MES
includes (µ, x(0)), which is represented by 2 · 33 = 66 secret
bits, and (α, β), which has 21 possible values. Thus, one can
see that the key space of MES is only 21 · 266, which is not
sufficiently large from the cryptographical point of view [15].
What’s worse, since the Logistic map is not chaotic for all
values of µ far less than 4, the key space is even smaller than
21 · 266. To make MES practically secure in today’s digital
world, the key space should be not less than O
(
2128
)
. One
simple method to enlarge the key space is to realize the chaotic
Logistic map with a higher finite precision, i.e., to increase the
number of secret bits for representing µ and x(0).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the security of a recently-proposed encryption
system called MES [3] has been studied in detail. A differ-
ential chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attack has been presented
to separate four encryption steps of this product cipher and
then break them one by one, with a divide-and-conquer
(DAC) strategy. After breaking all the four steps, it becomes
possible to break the secret key with a cryptographically small
complexity. It is also noticed that the security of MES against
brute-force attacks is not cryptographically high. It seems not
easy to efficiently improve MES without changing the basic
encryption structure and the employed encryption techniques.
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